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Abstract
In this thesis we have examined the Swedish nuclear power plant Ringhals by asking three questions: How does the 
search for legitimacy take shape at Ringhals?, What kinds of disciplining in Foucault’s terms can we find, and how do 
these affect the organization? and Which types of learning can we find at Ringhals and how do they learn from 
experiences? To answer these questions we have interviewed 24 employees, mainly about learning issues, but found 
indicators for legitimacy seeking and disciplining as well.  The special characteristics of the nuclear power industry with 
its safety rules, authority control, terrorist threat, public fear, risk management and environmental issues, make it 
interesting to study. In line with our questions we have analyzed the material along three master tracks; new 
institutional theory, disciplining and organizational learning. We have been overloaded with ingredients, which we have 
tried to sort out, cook, package and serve in a delicious takeaway meal, provided in this thesis. We concluded that the 
search for legitimacy has many faces at Ringhals. Giving an old phenomenon a new costume brings attention to the 
issue and might speed up the change process, which always is slow due to inertia.  We also found fractions of strong 
corporate culture (or brainwashing, depending on which mood you’re in), separation from the outside world, division of 
space and functional locations. Although Ringhals has a substantial learning toolbox, we have considered high reporting 
frequency as a crucial prerequisite for learning, which turned our interest to factors contributing to reporting. Besides 
the reporting, we believe that their practice to ask “Why” is a good way of learning from experiences. If you think that 
it is enough to read the abstract or the conclusions to understand this thesis,  we strongly recommend that you read the 
complete composition, since there are some grains of gold along the way...
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Introduction
In the control room, there used to be two buttons placed right next to each other with the 
same color. One was right and the other completely wrong, in a certain situation. This kind 
of event could have stopped there by being merely a risk observation. What happened was 
that an operator in that situation pushed the wrong button causing a reactor trip.1
A reactor trip costs at least 4 million SEK in lost income2, and all the operators are painfully aware of this. Working at a 
nuclear power plant implies not only a big responsibility in terms of safety, there is also an everyday risk of causing 
huge costs for the plant.
The Nuclear power industry has special characteristics, such as safety rules, authority control, terrorist threat, public 
fear, risk management, environmental issues and the parliament's power to close the plant down, all of which make it 
interesting to study. All these characteristics also make it important to learn from mistakes, and to learn in order to be 
prepared for an uncertain future.  Our initial focus was learning, which we have held on to during our journey in Thesis 
Wonderland. When studying the learning tools presented to us,  we reflected upon how these tools were communicated. 
Even though we were truly interested in learning about their learning, we still needed a critical approach to make it 
more interesting and this was found in the new institutional theory and disciplining theory (which we will present in the 
problem analysis). In our problem analysis we have therefore chosen three different perspectives: new institutional 
theory, disciplining and learning.
Problem Analysis
New Institutional Theory
For those unfamiliar with Meyer and Rowan's (1977) new institutional theory one might say that they tried to find an 
alternative explanation to the traditional view that organizations are structured in response to pure economic efficiency. 
A key word in their reasoning is “institution”, which is basically everything, or nothing if you prefer that since it is just 
a word. An institution is something taken for granted, that recombines people's daily functioning such as the idea of the 
use of money. You can go to a supermarket and receive a chocolate bar in exchange for money and both you and the 
cashier have a tacit agreement that nothing but money is valid to pay with, not even the rims of your car worth many 
times more than the chocolate bar.
In our thesis about nuclear power industry and particularly the plant at Ringhals it will be interesting to get an insight on 
the institutional environment that surrounds the nuclear power industry. Just like the example of money as an 
institution,  there is a prevailing idea about how the nuclear power industry, in which Ringhals exists,  should work. 
Meyer and Rowan call them “institutionalized organizations” and state that organizations seek legitimacy by designing 
the formal structure accordant to the prescriptions of myth in the institutional environment. For instance, we suppose 
that safety work is part of that myth and therefore emphasis on that sort of work is rewarded. Since the survival of the 
industry is tightly connected with the general public's confidence, the legitimacy ought to be of great importance to its 
existence. Meyer and Rowan argue that formal structures that follow the institutionalized myths differ from structures 
that act efficiently. The organizations realize that structures that give legitimacy imply decreasing level of efficiency. 
One solution is to decouple the formal structures from the ongoing activities (informal structures). 
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2 As you will see in this thesis, a shut down reactor costs 170 000 SEK per hour, and since it takes about 24 hours to return to normal production, the 
cost should amount to at least 4 millions per stop.
A further development to the new institutional theory was written by DiMaggio and Powell (2002) where they tried to 
explain what makes organizations, in the same field, so similar. Being in the same field would in our thesis correspond 
to all the nuclear power plants. They had observed that rational actors trying to change the organization only made it 
more similar to the other organizations in their field.  They called this process isomorphism (Greek: ison “equal”, and 
morphe “shape”). Digging even deeper in our brains and assuming that Ringhals seeks legitimacy and are willing to 
take measures to improve we figure that the idea of traveling recipes (Røvik 2000) would be a tool for organizations 
walking down that road. Røvik identified institutionalized standards for organization and leadership that travel in space 
and time. These ideas appear around the globe within a certain time and are adopted by organizations. The recipes have 
a limited duration and will eventually disappear (if they go out of fashion) or become modified (re-institutionalized) to 
be used again with a slightly changed packaging.
 
The nuclear power energy might not be the first thing that crosses one's mind when thinking of 
environmental sustainability, but a sustainable energy source is exactly what the nuclear power industry wants to market 
itself as. Compared to for example a coal power plant,  the nuclear power plant emits no carbon dioxide, and this gives 
nuclear power advantages in today's debate about greenhouse gasses. Ahrne and Papakostas (2002) introduced the term 
glade to describe when companies find new unapplied spaces to conquer. We will try to apply this theory on the nuclear 
power industry. Has the climate change opened a glade for the nuclear power to regain legitimacy, after losing it 
through referendum, governmental decisions and Chernobyl? The fact that uranium mining is not an environment-
friendly activity and the still unsolved question about where the final storage of radioactive waste should be located are 
issues that might bother the image of nuclear power as the perfect solution of the world's energy needs. With the energy 
debate in mind it is clear that nuclear power industry is dependent on its legitimacy.   
 
To sum up our reasoning, we expect that in the study of a nuclear power plant organization, we will come across the 
phenomenon which Meyer and Rowan (1977:356) call decoupling. A nuclear power plant organization has an 
institutional environment to consider,  and to keep the daily activities working they have to give a good picture of the 
organization to its environment. If they fail, they risk disturbing of the business by one or many of the factors 
mentioned in the introduction. We are curious to find out which signs of legitimacy seeking that can be observed at 
Ringhals. Therefore, our first question will be: How does the search for legitimacy take shape at Ringhals?
Disciplining
It is also interesting to reflect upon what monitoring does to an organization. A nuclear power plant organization is 
highly regulated,  has heavy administration, has no space to commit serious mistakes and has an institutional 
environment to pay regard to. Foucault (2003:139 ff.) discusses aspects of disciplining and surveillance. He states that 
the disciplining doesn’t need any brutal methods to achieve desired results, and that details are not to be underestimated 
when it comes to disciplining. This suggests that one should look for small things when searching for elements of 
disciplining. The first kind of surveillance we think of is the authority control, performed by for example the Swedish 
Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI), but there are probably more - and more subtle - types of monitoring and disciplining 
present at the nuclear power plant. It is easy to state that the monitoring and disciplining forces deprive the organization 
of its creativity and acting space, but as Foucault (2003:195) states - why always describe the effects of power in 
negative terms? The power is productive! It creates a reality, subject areas, rituals of truth, and even individuals. One 
could question if the nuclear power industry would be able to learn anything at all without authority regulation and 
control, whereupon we assume that disciplining is important to them. Our second question will therefore be: What kinds 
of disciplining in Foucault’s terms can we find, and how do these affect the organization?
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Learning
We believe learning is an important issue in a nuclear power plant organization, and are interested in finding out what 
kinds of learning one might find in such an organization.  With disaster planning as in Czarniawska et al. (2007) in 
mind,  our first plan was to study big catastrophic events that have occurred in the history of nuclear power. Those 
events should offer great opportunities for learning, which also was confirmed when we studied them. However, we 
soon realized that such events are (luckily!) not very common, whereupon we broadened our focus to smaller events 
like incidents which are not critical, but still means a difference from normal business.
We assumed that learning from incidents would be an important part of the learning process. People make mistakes 
daily3, but at a nuclear power plant a mistake can be devastating. Argyris (1990) states that there are two different kinds 
of learning, one that is more like trial and error learning (Single Loop Learning), and one that means a deeper reflection 
over the governing variables behind the acting (Double Loop Learning). We wonder whether Ringhals has managed to 
conduct Double Loop Learning with reflection over governing variables inbound in the process, or if they only have 
performed Single Loop Learning. (This of course assumes that there do prevail some kind of learning in the 
organization, but that is an assumption we make to be able to continue our reasoning.)
It is easy to think that the Double Loop Learning would be the better one of the two kinds of learning, but in occasional 
situations the Single Loop Learning satisfies the learning needs well enough. Argyris (1990) exemplifies with the 
thermostat, that switches the heat on or off depending on what temperature information it obtains. It doesn't have to 
reflect upon why the temperature has changed in either direction.
However, in some situations,  reflection is necessary, and one such situation might be at a nuclear power plant when a 
mistake has been made. One doesn't want that mistake to be repeated , and it is a safety issue not to let it happen again. 
The first thing that has to be done in order to learn from mistakes is that the mistake becomes known, which calls for 
reporting. It is important to create an environment where one doesn’t look for scapegoats and where the whistleblower 
feels safe after reporting disproportions. The second thing needed is that a Double Loop Learning is accomplished so 
that the reasons why the mistake was made are reflected over.
Thus what we will look for at Ringhals is how their reporting of mistakes works,  if there is a scapegoat or 
whistleblower culture, and if experiences of mistakes are used to decrease the risk of future incidents. With the 
decoupling theory in mind we cannot expect anything else than a picture of a well functioning organization, but we will 
try to see through the facade as good as we can and try to find out how the learning is pursued. Our third question is 
thus: Which types of learning can we find at Ringhals and how do they learn from experiences?
Compiling, our questions are:
1. How does the search for legitimacy take shape at Ringhals?
2. What kinds of disciplining in Foucault’s terms can we find, and how do these affect the 
organization?
3. Which types of learning can we find at Ringhals and how do they learn from 
experiences?
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To find answers to these questions we contacted Ringhals and their Information Centre helped us (or prevented us?) to 
come into contact with key functions. We wanted to interview people on different organizational levels, both managers 
and “blue collar workers”. We were helped by a nice gentleman (a gatekeeper?) who scheduled interviews with people 
mainly in management positions. In order to get the “blue collar workers’” opinions we visited a kickoff and asked a 
few simple questions during the break. In addition we have made a number of phone interviews. Altogether we have 
spoken to 24 people from the Ringhals staff (see reference list for further information).  Our interviewing tactic was to 
ask open-ended questions focusing mainly on learning and safety culture, and then carefully listen to elements of 
legitimacy,  decoupling and disciplining. Broad questions generate broad answers, and one of our interviews was 
scheduled for one hour,  but took three hours due to enthusiastic respondents. We have also found information in 
research reports, newsletters, articles, web pages and organizational literature. Besides the interviewing and reading we 
have also had an intensive e-mail struggle to confirm certain diffuse information from a web page belonging to a 
nuclear power authority. Another battle (which we also lost) was to obtain access to a questionnaire about attitude 
towards safety culture at Ringhals (which we did not get access to) and a bigger survey on the entire corporate group of 
Vattenfall, called My Opinion (see last parenthesis).
Nuclear facts
In our opinion it is necessary to be confident with facts about the nuclear power industry to be able to discuss it in an 
interesting way. Our empirics therefore starts with a description of the nuclear power industry,  Ringhals, International 
Nuclear Event Scale (INES), well-known incidents and surveillance.
The Nuclear Power Industry
In Sweden there are ten nuclear power reactors in three different plants - Forsmark (3 reactors), Ringhals (4 reactors) 
and Oskarshamn (3 reactors). Approximately half of Sweden's electricity comes from nuclear power,  the rest is mostly 
from hydro power and (a few per cent) from wind power and other kinds of power. In the world, nuclear power stands 
for about a fifth of the electricity and there are about 440 nuclear reactors worldwide.4 Until 2005 Sweden had four 
nuclear power plants,  but Barsebäck was closed down as a result of political decisions.5 The oldest, and in a way also 
the newest, nuclear power reactor in Sweden is Oskarshamn 1, started commercial operation in 1972 and completed an 
extensive modernization in 2002.6
All the Swedish nuclear power reactors are so called light water reactors, which means that ordinary water is used to 
moderate and cool the reactors. Other moderation alternatives are graphite (as in Chernobyl, Ukraine and Ignalina, 
Lithuania) or heavy water.  Nuclear fuel consists of uranium which is mined both from open pit and underground mines. 
Canada, Australia and Kazakhstan are the largest uranium producers in the world7. Uranium mining is associated with 
several environmental and health problems, for example lung cancer among workers (Gilliland et al. 2000) and 
contaminated groundwater (Valerie 2007). The uranium mined from the deposits around the world is not possible to use 
in its natural form in an ordinary nuclear power reactor without being enriched, i.e. increasing the proportion of the 
isotope uranium-235 from about 0,7% to 2-5%8. Sweden imports enriched uranium mainly from Canada, Russia and 
Australia and doesn't have any enrichment plants of its own. The enriched uranium is refined to nuclear fuel - formed 
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into small pellets like uranium oxide ceramics and organized in 4 meters long fuel bundles. In Sweden this process is 
performed at the nuclear fuel manufacturing facility in Västerås. Unused fuel is not especially radioactive and can be 
handled without radiation protection9.
In a nuclear power reactor uranium-235 atoms are split with the help of neutrons. The process is called fission and 
releases energy that is used for heating water which drives turbines and generators which generates electricity. Once 
started the process maintains itself until the fuel is used up. Every split atom releases new neutrons which thereafter 
split new atoms. When the uranium atom is split it no longer is a uranium atom. The parts of the uranium atom are 
called fission products and are radioactive. Two fission products which are important from the viewpoint of potential 
radiological impact on humans are iodine-131 and cesium-137.10 After about five years the fuel is used up and needs to 
be exchanged. At Ringhals they change a fifth of the fuel once a year. To do that it is necessary to stop the reactor, 
which is done during approximately one month every year.  The outage is preferably performed summertime when the 
electricity consumption in Sweden as well as the electricity prices are at its lowest. Used fuel is highly radioactive and 
needs to decay for 1000-100 000 years to become harmless.11 The issue on where to store the used fuel is still unsolved, 
and in the meantime it is stored at Central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (CLAB) outside Oskarshamn. 
There are plans to place it in the bedrock five hundred meters deep. Among other factors, two ice ages are taken into 
account when choosing the depth, since each ice age is estimated to wear down the ground 150-200 meters.12
Inside the reactor, around the fuel, is water, which becomes heated and is used in one of two ways depending on type of 
reactor. If the water level becomes too low, the cooling function disappears, and there is a reactor meltdown within two 
hours.13 In Sweden we have two types of nuclear power reactors, Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) and Pressurized Water 
Reactor (PWR). The common feature is that heated water is led through a turbine, which drives a generator and 
generates electricity.  With three PWRs (R2, R3 and R4) and one BWR (R1) Ringhals is the only Swedish nuclear power 
plant that has both kinds of reactors.  PWR is the most usual reactor type internationally. US, France, Japan and Russia 
are countries which have many PWRs.14
When needed, it must be possible to stop the fission process quite fast. This is done by inserting control rods made of 
neutron-absorbing material.15 After a sudden reactor trip it may take up to 24 hours before the plant is brought back into 
normal operation again. A halt in one reactor at Ringhals costs about 170 000 SEK per hour in lost incomes, which 
makes it very expensive to stop the reactor when not absolutely needed.16
 
The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident (more about this further down in this thesis) in 1979 contributed to the Swedish 
referendum on nuclear power in 1980. Unfortunately there were not only a yes- and a no-option in the referendum, 
there was also a third option: to phase out nuclear power with regard to welfare and energy need of Sweden. After the 
referendum the Swedish parliament decided to phase out the nuclear power plants during a time period lasting until 
2010. The intention was to find new energy technologies until it was time to phase out the nuclear power. New reactors 
were taken in use and the oil dependence decreased a little. Then there was the Chernobyl accident in 1986, and people 
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saw the dramatic consequences. The former nuclear energy friendly debate took another direction and in 1988 the 
Swedish parliament decided to start the decommissioning of the first nuclear power plants in 1995-1996. At the same 
time the importance of not to increase the carbon dioxide emissions was stressed, which evoked the question if Swedish 
energy policy really was possible to carry out: To phase out nuclear power, not to extend water power, not to increase 
carbon dioxide emissions and this without any negative consequences for employment and welfare. The decision of 
1988 was however discarded and the next decommission decision came in 1997 when the parliament decided to shut 
down Barsebäck. That was also done,  the first Barsebäck reactor was closed in 1999 and the second (and last) was 
closed in 2005. The owner of Barsebäck, EON (formerly Sydkraft) was compensated through a partnership in Ringhals 
of 30%.
When we visited Ringhals and spoke to the people working there we expected them to be troubled over the future of the 
nuclear power industry. We thought that they might be worried about a closedown of Ringhals power plant. Instead they 
surprised us by telling that they saw nuclear power as a future energy source and that they were expecting new nuclear 
power plants in Sweden since Sweden is dependent on its nuclear power. The Ringhals employees we spoke to seemed 
to have a great belief in the future.17 We were told that Vattenfall has plans to build new nuclear power plants in Sweden 
and that they will maintain the current power plants as long as it is possible.  For example, R2 will have a totally new 
control room in 2009 - a sign of that Vattenfall invests in Ringhals's future18. In their internal news letter their former 
communications manager is interviewed about the history of the nuclear debate and states that it felt like a knockout 
when the government decided to go through with the closing of Barsebäck.19
The events of 9-11 have influenced the nuclear power industry as well as the rest of the world. One aspect of this is the 
SKIFS 2005:1 (prescription from Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, SKI) which were issued in 2005, but has 
gradually started to pertain.  The prescription states more restrictive control over the nuclear power plant area to enhance 
security. The employees are no longer permitted to drive their cars inside the gates, biometric control with finger prints 
is used for those who shall access the control room, and it is carefully restricted who has right to access the plant area.20 
We experienced the strict rules when we went to Ringhals for this study as we weren't allowed to enter the gates. 
Luckily they have an information center outside the gates for those who aren't permitted to enter, so we didn't have to 
stay outdoors. No matter how hard we tried to assert our innocence and non-terroristicness,  we had to stay outside the 
gates.
Ringhals
Ringhals,  located 60 kilometers south of Gothenburg, Sweden, is owned by Vattenfall (70%) and EON (30%). Today 
Ringhals produces 28 TWh each year (which is as much as five or six times the annual energy need of Gothenburg), but 
are heading towards a production capacity of 32 TWh in a couple of years. Ringhals employs 1480 people,  but the 
number of people working there is actually higher since there are many entrepreneurs at the plant during the annual 
outages, and also at other times of the year.21
With the delivery of the reactor the manufacturer hands over a manual for the power plant.  This manual is called Safety 
Analysis Report (SAR), and it states how the reactor is constructed and what safety levels that are needed. From the 
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SAR another document is derived, namely the Safety Technical Specifications (STF)22, which is a very important 
document also called "the Bible" at Ringhals.23 The STF is recurrently updated by the reactor operators so that it is 
always up-to-date. Updates of the STF are often motivated by exchange of a component where the new component has 
other specifications than the former. Every change of the STF must be signed by the reactor manager and announced to 
SKI.24  When any of the prescriptions in the STF is violated it becomes an RO (Reportable event), which has to be 
reported to SKI. Violation of the STF doesn't have to emanate from a human mistake, it is often some limit value of 
pressure or temperature that has been overridden and therefore has to be reported and adjusted.
However, one human related regulation in the STF is that the minimum number of control room operators allowed is 
seven. If it falls below seven they have to stop the reactor. Therefore the control room is staffed by eight to ten people 
24 hours a day. The control room staff has the global responsibility over the nuclear power reactor. A couple of them are 
not allowed to leave the room and one of them - the shift supervisor - is in charge over the reactor and the people 
working there. At R2, the reactor we received most information about, they have seven shift teams with about 10-12 
people in each who operates the reactor.25 The shift teams usually become very close-knit since they work so tightly and 
sometimes experience stressful situations together.26
Every task at Ringhals is highly specified. It might be enough with a high school exam to become a reactor operator, but 
you have to pass years of internal education before you can be on duty in the control room.27
It is quite heavy administration at Ringhals,  where mostly tasks mustn't be done without authorization from the control 
room.28 As one of our informants says: The person who wants to just go ahead and fix things immediately, doesn’t fit in 
at Ringhals.29. The control room staff has rigorous check lists to go over before they can start again after an annual 
outage.30 Despite the heavy instruction dependence, it might still be a space for creativity, not in the performing of 
tasks, but in the discussion about working methods.31
The people we spoke to bore witness about different cultures at the four reactors.32 There are several explanations to 
this, but one is that the people of the different reactors work quite isolated from each other.  R3 and R4 have the most 
similar cultures, and this is not surprising since the reactors are identical,  so called Mirror Plants. R1 is of another kind 
than the other three, a BWR reactor, giving them more in common with the reactors at Forsmark and Oskarshamn.
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INES - The International Nuclear Event Scale
IN E S w a s i n t r o d u c e d b y t h e 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in the 1990s, and is used for 
facilitating fast communication to the 
media and the public regarding the 
safety significance of events at any 
nuclear installation associated with the 
civil nuclear industry, including events 
involving the use of radiation sources 
and the transport of radioactive 
materials.  Events are classified on the 
scale at seven levels: levels 4–7 are 
termed “accidents” and levels 1–3 
“incidents”. Events without safety 
significance are termed “deviations” and are classified below scale at level 0. Events without relevance to radiological 
or nuclear safety are termed “out of scale”.33
 
Wellknown incidents
The accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (rated 5 on INES) on March 28,  1979, was 
triggered by a disturbance leading to a reactor trip. A relief valve got stuck in open position, causing a cooling water 
leakage,  which was unnoticed by the operators. The safety system went off, and started to pour out more cooling water. 
The operators were unable to diagnose or respond properly to the unplanned automatic shutdown of the reactor, and 
shut the water supply. The core boiled dry and partly melted and the reactor was completely destroyed. There was some 
radioactive gas released but no human being was injured. The cleanup of the damaged nuclear reactor system took 
nearly 12 years and cost nearly US$ 1 billion.34
 
After the TMI accident the industry learned the importance of having several safety systems working independently 
from one another. Deficient control room instrumentation and inadequate emergency response training was proved to be 
root causes of the accident. The need for better educated workforce lead to the building of simulators permitting 
operators to learn and be tested on all kinds of accident scenarios. The sad fact is that a similar incident occurred at a 
reactor at Davis-Besse only six months earlier.  With a better system for operating experience feedback, the TMI 
accident might have been prevented.35
The movie The China Syndrome had its premiere twelve days before TMI36 and was considered prophetic by the public.
In Chernobyl the 26th of April 1986 (rated 7 on the INES scale) the operators performed a test to determine how long 
turbines would spin and supply power following a loss of main electrical power supply. The aim was to increase safety. 
Unfortunately, something went wrong and the reactor was forced to decrease its effect, which makes that kind of reactor 
less stable. In spite of the risks, they continued experimenting, and had to disconnect some of the safety systems. Within 
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seconds, the effect was increased 400 times37,  the fuel elements ruptured and the resultant explosive force of steam 
lifted off the cover plate of the reactor, releasing fission products to the atmosphere. A second explosion threw out 
fragments of burning fuel and graphite from the core and allowed air to rush in, causing the graphite moderator to burst 
into flames.
Within a week all 161 000 inhabitants living within a 30 kilometer radius were evacuated and later relocated. In the 
following years a further 210 000 people were resettled into less contaminated areas. Relocations of people were very 
traumatic and did little to reduce radiation exposure. Psychosocial effects among those affected by the accident can be 
compared to those arising from other major disasters such as earthquakes, floods and fires. Reliable information about 
the accident and resulting contamination was not available to affected people for about two years following the 
accident. This led to major distrust and confusion about health effects.38
The lesson learned from the Chernobyl disaster was the need to implement safety culture within the nuclear power 
plants. The concept of safety culture brought attention to the impact of human factors.39  There has been thorough 
experience exchange between nuclear operators in east and west following Chernobyl.40
 
On July 25th 2006 a reactor was shut down after an incident at the Swedish Nuclear Power Plant Forsmark. It all started 
with a loss of offsite power. Within seconds,  both turbines tripped, causing a complete reactor scram. The critical issue 
was to keep the reactor cooling running. This part of the safety system at Forsmark had three independent weaknesses, 
and all three happened at the same time!41  Talk about bad luck… Fortunately, the shift team had dealt with situations 
similar to what actually occurred, in the simulator training, and applied their knowledge correctly (according to the 
company responsible for the simulator training). Within 22 minutes the whole thing was over.  There was a happy 
ending to the incident, which was classified INES 2, but the public was concerned about the weaknesses in the safety 
systems. Vattenfall later admitted safety shortcomings42, and the Swedish government decided to let the IAEA supervise 
Forsmark.43 Besides the bad publicity, this incident was very expensive, since four reactors44 had to close for almost 
two months at a total cost of nearly 2 000 000 000 SEK45 in lost incomes.
Surveillance - Big Brother IRL46
A decade after the atomic bombings that ended the WW2, the U.S. President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for peace-speech” to 
the UN General Assembly led to the creation of IAEA. This initiative was a signal that it was time to release the secret 
knowledge of nuclear technology for peaceful use, also knowing that a supervising authority would be required to 
maintain that state. Although IAEA is under the wings of the United Nations and reports annually,  it is an independent 
organization.
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38 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html
39 Christer Axelsson
40 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html
41 Ringhals had already fixed the problem with the safety system shortfall, long time before the Forsmark incident...
42 http://www.mandarinab.com/windowsmedia/HansvonUthmann.wmv
43 http://www.analys.se/lankar/Bakgrunder/2007/Bkg%201-07%20Forsmark%20Eng.pdf
44 Forsmark 1, Forsmark 2, Oskarshamn 1 and Oskarshamn 2. Since other reactors were supposed to have the same safety weakness, they had to be 
stopped for reconstruction.
45 SVT Rapport 2007-01-15, http://mobil.svt.se/svt/jsp/Crosslink.jsp?d=22620&a=762256
46 IRL is short for In Real Life
The agency works with its 144 member states to promote secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. Over time the 
prospects for nuclear power have been varying. According to IAEA, nuclear power held a strong position in the mid 
70’s as a result of commercially available technology and the oil crises,  with a drastic decrease of public acceptance in 
the wakes of Chernobyl.47 Others would say that the resistance against nuclear power was significant at an earlier stage, 
especially after the TMI-accident. 
 
On national level in Sweden the supervision is mainly carried out by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). 
Since 1974 SKI have worked on behalf of the government to ensure that the power plants follow the regulations of the 
Act on Nuclear Activities (SFS 1984:14). Inspections and reviews are important tools for SKI to ensure that the power 
plants take their responsibility to perform the operations in a safe manner. If the power plant fails to live up to the 
standards set, SKI can decide to cancel the licensee’s right to conduct nuclear activities, until they have taken the 
measures needed. SKI is also the agency responsible for reviewing the planned waste program.48 In June 2008 SKI will 
merge with SSI, Swedish Radiation Protection Authority.49
 
Partly because of the Forsmark incident 2006, the Swedish government mandated SKI to request an international safety 
inspection from IAEA, according to a press release in March 2007. The Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) will 
visit all Swedish power plants, for approximately three weeks each, to study steering documents and to interview staff 
on each plant.50
 
Consequently, IAEA and SKI are external inspectors, the former on international and the latter on national Swedish 
level. Besides that, WANO (World Association of Nuclear Operators) was created after Chernobyl as the nuclear 
operators realized that what happens in one country affects other countries. WANO consists of almost all the nuclear 
power plants in the world and allows the members to exchange operating experiences without feeling the pressure from 
external authorities. Therefore, WANO has no governmental associations or commercial ties. The members pay a fee 
and can then with open mind do peer reviews and exchange knowledge across the borders. An inspection from WANO 
is performed on initiative from the power plant itself. Not even SKI is allowed to read the full report, although they are 
the ones in position to set back the entire operation if needed. However,  according to our respondents, the nuclear 
power plant usually serves on the relevant information to SKI.51
 
To put it short, IAEA inspect the plant in more general terms while WANO aim to cover the activities all the way down 
to “blue-collar workers”. In June 2009 Ringhals will welcome WANO for a voluntary inspection.52
Learning tools at Ringhals 
Since our initial question for this thesis was how learning is occurring at Ringhals, it would appear irrational not to 
present our findings in this topic. These five explicit learning tools were presented to us at Ringhals: Introduction to 
New Employees, Simulator Training, Competence Analysis, Experience Feedback and the Program for Competence 
Transfer. Some of the sections contain many abbreviations, see footnotes for explanation. There is also an abbreviation 
list in the end of the thesis.
Borglin, Lindell and Lindström (2008)
16
47 http://www.iaea.org/About/history.html
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49 Christer Axelsson and Bengt Ljungquist.
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51 Christer Axelsson
52 Christer Axelsson
Introduction for new employees - newbie training
When new employees are recruited to the plant, there is a compulsory introduction program spread on 12 occasions as a 
minimum, but it is not uncommon with more. Every training course last for everything from a few hours to a couple of 
days. The compulsory program contains courses about protection,  environment,  safety culture and cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation. Depending on what position the new employee is to attend further courses are assigned.53
Simulator training - preparing for the worst case scenario
Simulator training is an important part of the education of the control room staff, and they have to do simulator training 
at least twice a year. The simulator is an copy of the control room, thus there are three simulators, since R3 and R4 are 
mirror plants.54
In the simulator the reactor operators practice different kinds of events.  The control room staff is never prepared to what 
kind of event will be practiced, but the training is usually based on some recent event at nuclear power plants around the 
world. For example, all the Swedish reactor operators have practiced the Forsmark incident. The situation in the 
simulator is designed to be as realistic as possible, and the Ringhals employees we spoke to confirm that sometimes you 
don't know if you are in the simulator or in a real situation.55 The training is filmed and a training leader is watching the 
control room staff to give feedback later.56
Competence Analysis - what do you know and need to know, anyway?
After pressure from SKI, Ringhals reestablished their competence management system and made it more structured. 
Today there is a requirement profile for each position, where it is stated what kind of skills are needed for the position 
and to what extent the employee needs to master the skills. This is compared to the competence profile of the employee. 
The competence profile is followed up regularly in dialogue with the employee and the employee's boss. If a gap is 
found between current skills and needed skills, the employee is assigned to appropriate courses.57
Creating the competence profiles was a voluminous work. The personnel department held group sessions for a couple of 
days with every division of the organization where the division's mission, responsibility and knowledge and skills 
needed to accomplish that mission and responsibility were discussed. The discussion then boiled down to which 
positions that were needed and what kind of knowledge and skills that were needed on those positions. Goal profiles 
were created for every position in the organization. In the requirement profile every skill is measured on a 0-6 scale. 
The massive work seems to pay off since the concept works well, according to our respondent.58
Operating Experience Feedback - avoiding hangovers
WANO stands for a good deal of the international experience feedback, through its four main programs: Operating 
Experience, Peer Reviews, Professional and Technical Development and Technical Support and Exchange.59 We will 
focus on Operating Experience Feedback as it is carried out locally at Ringhals. Our main information source is 
interviews held with Ringhals employees.
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53 Annika Bergquist
54 http://www.vattenfall.se/www/vf_se/vf_se/518304omxva/518334vxrxv/518814vxrxe/518844omxkx/518874sxker/519054simul/index.jsp retrieved 
2008-05-09
55 Bengt Ljungquist and Christer Axelsson
56 Anders Henoch
57 Annika Bergquist
58 Annika Bergquist
59 http://www.wano.info/WANO_Programmes/Programmes.asp retrieved 2008-05-12
At WANO's inspection of Ringhals in 2005, the internal experience feedback at Ringhals was criticized. After WANO's 
report the management of Ringhals decided to create a new division, which was launched in March 2008 and got the 
name RQH60. RQH's main working areas are internal experience feedback, safety culture, deviation management, 
analysis, process development, MTO61  investigations and error prevention. The plan is to make Ringhals the leader 
of operating experience feedback in the nuclear power industry within five years. Of course these issues have been alive 
in the organization also before the start of RQH, but now those people who have shown big interest in the issue of 
experience feedback are gathered under one roof.  SKI sees RQH as a help in its work with inspecting the nuclear power 
plant, since RQH will cooperate with SKI.62
The RQH people we spoke to are enthusiastic about the task to improve internal experience feedback at Ringhals. More 
than half of the things WANO pointed at in their report was things that the internal audit already knew, but it hadn't 
been taken seriously by the rest of the organization. SKI’s complaints are also taken more seriously than complaints 
from the internal audit.  The Forsmark incident in July 2006 has given additional weight to the internal experience 
feedback issues.63
An ERF64 group consisting of representatives from different parts of the organization is meeting every week.  The ERF 
group considers several kinds of input:
• Work related injuries and mishaps.
• RIO65  - when someone has observed something that might become a risk. RQH hopes to soon implement 
Near Miss, which is when someone is close to make a mistake, but luckily didn't.
• An MTO investigation is done when an INES-1 incident is caused by human error. (Since such severe 
incidents are unusual, the reactor management can decide that an MTO investigation has to be done anyway.)
• Internal audit.
• RO66 means an event that violates the STF67,  for example open fire doors. When an RO happens a Licensee 
Event Report must be written and distributed to SKI. At Ringhals 200-300 ROs use to happen each year.68 
• Internal Experience Feedback
• External Experience Feedback
RQH produces ERF leaflets once a week containing information about important experiences and how to avoid 
common errors.  The ERF leaflets are stored at the local intranet,  visible to the entire Ringhals organization. RQH has 
made an explicit decision not to e-mail it out to the employees, since they don't want to flood people with information. 
RQH's expectation is that people who are about to do a specific job enters the intranet and reads the specific ERF leaflet 
that concerns the job. The ERF leaflets then will work as a database of information. According to Christer Axelsson the 
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63 Christer Axelsson and Bengt Ljungquist
64 ERF is short for the Swedish word for Operating Experience Feedback
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66 Reportable Events
67 Safety Technical Specifications
68 Christer Axelsson and Bengt Ljungquist
ERF leaflets have been positively received, but none of the eleven people we spoke to at the kickoff before the annual 
outage had read them. Perhaps the phenomenon is still too new to be evaluated.69
The RQH people also states the importance of discovering errors at an as early stage as possible. By referring to the 
Bird triangle70  they showed that for every severe event there are 10-30 less severe events,  and for these there are 30-600 
minor events,  and for these there are 600-1000 really trivial events, like near misses or risk observations. If the trivial 
events are dealt with at an early stage, more severe events can be prevented. By asking 'why' and follow the origins of 
the errors one can prevent the serious events. According to WANO it is recommendable to have 1000 Near Miss 
Reports each year per reactor. At Ringhals they currently have about 500 for the entire plant. The goal is to reach 5000 
Near Miss Reports in a near future. In order to increase the reporting RQH is working with education (for example a 
course named “Five times why”), coaching and culture (they have identified a Nordic culture based on similar problems 
within the Nordic power plants).  They try to establish an atmosphere without need for scapegoats. In Sweden they call 
it “no blame culture”, a Swedicized variant to the counterparts in the UK and US where they call it a “blame tolerant 
culture”.71 Same same, but a little different perhaps? In reality you cannot disregard the fact that the word will spread 
and soon many people inside the plant will know if someone makes a mistake, but the formal picture is that blaming 
doesn’t occur since no one will benefit from that. The question about anonymous reporting was raised at the kickoff 
before the annual outage at R2. The questioner was suggested to choose the paper form, instead of reporting on the 
intranet,  and leave the name field blank. On the other hand one of the fundamental ideas with submitting one’s name on 
the report is the possibility to follow up the errand. The gathering of people at the hall were assured that there will occur 
no sanctions for those who report RIOs and other events.
At the kickoff previously mentioned the employees where told about last year's outage when a communication problem 
caused 4,5 days longer outage time. With the help of HU-cards72, the employees will improve their communication so 
that such errors won’t be repeated. The HU-cards consists of three plastic cards of credit card size that is to be carried 
around the neck. The cards include check lists on what to consider when attending a PJB73 and what alphabetic names 
to use when spelling a word for someone in a noisy environment. The HU-cards are a brand new tactic to improve 
communication, increase reporting of RIOs and to give the employees the courage to stop a project if they sense 
something wrong. At the same occasion as this message was communicated, the employees were encouraged to make a 
safe and fast annual outage. One funny thing about the HU-cards is that one of the cards states that one should use well-
recognized nomenclature, a word few of the people attending the kickoff understood. To use well-recognized 
nomenclature is to use words that other people understands, which obviously wasn't done on the HU-cards.74
The operating manager whom we have spoke to welcomed the new division by saying that experience feedback is 
difficult but important, and that it is good with a separate division to handle those issues. Since the four reactors have 
significantly different cultures the new division can help to work with experience feedback in a similar way. He is not 
sure that RQH will unburden the managers,  on the contrary it might generate more work for them too.75  But, as 
everybody says: safety first!
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69 Christer Axelsson and Bengt Ljungquist, people at the R2 outage kickoff 28th April 2008
70 http://www.ski.se:80/dynamaster/file_archive/070514/84a47ac0b5305268da2cb2fe2bedd5d0/web%5f2007%2d16.pdf
71 Christer Axelsson and Bengt Ljungquist
72 HU is short for Human Performance
73 PJB is short for Pre Job Briefing, a meeting held before starting a new project.
74 Christer Axelsson at R2's kick-off before the annual outage 2008
75 Per Therén
The program for competence transfer - newbies playin’ with the big boys 
No matter how good experience feedback works, it won’t serve the organization if the knowledge walks out the door 
inside a retiring person’s head. The need for a program for knowledge transfer,  to keep the tacit knowledge within the 
corporation, originated from an increasing need to bridge the generation gap. Lars Nylander, manager at the division 
RUM76 and Mats Eriksson from the University of Gothenburg formed a project where thirteen elderly employees were 
involved in recruiting their successor (an engineer or technician usually aged between 20 and 35, newly employed at 
Ringhals or,  in some cases, formerly working with different functions). For approximately a year the tutor and the 
successor will work side by side. The tutors are educated in order to communicate their tacit knowledge before their 
retirement and the successors should document what they learn.
The competence transfer program focuses on three levels:
1. The successor’s learning process, where he (so far there are no females involved) should, through theoretical 
and practical education, obtain the skills from an experienced employee and make them his own skills. 
2. A group oriented learning process, where the specific competence of every employee becomes available and 
useful for the entire team’s competence development.
3. The tutor’s learning process during the elicitation of the specific tacit knowledge.
At present, the project is half way through and it seems to work out very well for most of the participants.  When the 
pilot year ends in November, the project will be evaluated and improved. The plan is to make it permanent.77 So far, the 
most obvious weaknesses are, that the successors are not trained to ask the right questions to enable the knowledge 
transfer, and that there are no time set apart for the documentation. The documentation binder was supposed to become 
the employee’s “Bible”, which may be threatened by the fact that acute problems always win over documentation.78
The program for competence transfer has been positively received by the retiring employees,  even though several of the 
participants have expressed anguish over how to explain the unseen problems at the plant. Leif Bosson, one of the 
participating tutors, feels very content and honored to be given the opportunity to end his long career in this fruitful 
way. He feels that he has done his best, and that Ringhals has appreciated his contribution.
Analysis
On our journey through a scrubby landscape of fission, field studies and learning we have now arrived to the analysis 
part of this thesis, which we have chosen to separate into three parts in line with our problem analysis. We want to pour 
down our observations, mixed with additional theory and own thoughts, into a pressure cooker where an explosive 
meltdown hopefully will result in some interesting conclusion. Enter at own risk!
New Institutional Theory
We assume that most nuclear power plants would like to appear as the top of the line. At the same time they want the 
complete line to be on top, since the whole industry will benefit from that. The nuclear power industry is good at 
benchmarking79. Through control agencies, e.g. WANO, they receive feedback on how well they are doing. Røvik 
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79 Benchmarking means comparing to competitors and best practice, with the intention to improve the own organization.
describes organizational recipes as management trends traveling across the globe. The recipes are seldom total solutions 
for an entire complex organization, but rather building blocks. These are often general ideas and must be interpreted and 
clarified within the organizations before taken in use (Røvik 2000:16). The division RQH serves as a recipe interpreter 
for Ringhals, catching and sorting traveling recipes and deciding which ones to implement. With their general view over 
the international nuclear power industry WANO and IAEA serve as a recipe database for the industry. By distributing 
trends and recipes they contribute to conformity and isomorphism in the nuclear power industry. The recipe distributors 
also have power to decide what is correct and rational.  Jackson and Carter (2000) argue that knowledge cannot be 
separated from power, i.e. if we assume that agencies like IAEA have the superior power over the power plants,  they 
also have the power to dictate what knowledge is (i.e. they rule the discourse80) and therefore what recipes should be 
used. The internal audit got no response when they highlighted disproportions, but when WANO said the same thing - 
measures were taken relatively fast, which is another example of that WANO is powerful in the discourse.
As you probably already have noticed, we have been inspired largely by the old-established81 new-institutional thoughts 
from the late 1970s. An interesting issue linked to Meyer and Rowan's idea of decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977:357, 
359) is that a decoupled organization is likely to avoid inspections,  or at least make the inspections more ceremonial. 
When we compared this with Ringhals's welcoming of the WANO inspection in June 2008 we initially became 
confused. But there are possible explanations as we soon realized. One is that the WANO report will not be public. Not 
even SKI will have access to it,  which makes the report less “dangerous” in institutional terms. Another explanation 
might be that Ringhals uses the same strategy as IKEA's founder Ingvar Kamprad; to tell the “whole” truth to avoid 
further questions (Kamprad 1999). A third aspect is that the correct answer to our question about the WANO inspection 
of course would be that WANO is very welcome. To keep the good facade and give the correct answers to curious 
thesis-writing students is the least duty the Ringhals employees should fulfill to be good organizational participants.
When a new-institutional perspective is planted on organizational theory emphasis is put on organizational structures 
and processes within organizational fields. These fields are characterized by organizations that are in some way related 
to each other,  for instance as competitors in the same business, producers, suppliers, customers et cetera. DiMaggio and 
Powell suggest that “the field idea comprehends the importance of both connectedness and structural 
equivalence” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991:64). Based on that, we consider the nuclear power plant industry as an 
organizational field, where all the nuclear power plants are equal organizations connected to each other through their 
collective mission and values. One might dare to say that the field is almost a world on its own where the participants 
are more dependent on each other than the surrounding world. We found one sign of this in the staff magazine at 
Ringhals,  where the former head of the information department commented that the closedown of the nuclear power 
plant in Barsebäck was like a hit in the face.82  Taking into account that the closedown was hammered by the 
government already in the 1980s, the unexpected effect could seem a bit odd. On the other hand, decisions made by the 
government have been changed before and could therefore explain the glimpses of hope that seemed to exist in that 
matter. When we asked Bengt Ljungquist how the uncertain future of nuclear power plant affects the daily activities and 
planning at Ringhals he looked at us like he did not understand the question. Apparently no threat was in sight and the 
world’s uncompromising demand for electricity combined with environmental advantages (speaking of carbon dioxide 
emissions) granted the continued existence for the nuclear power industry.
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81 Two thirds of our group are born after the release of Meyer and Rowan’s classic article. The third of us was two years old at that time.
82 I strömmen, nr 7, 2007, page 11
Since Ringhals doesn’t sense any threats, they can fully focus on the search for a balance between safety and 
profitability. We got the impression from our respondents that the executive group earlier have favored being profitable 
but have now started to sway over to focus on safety work. The strongest argument from the safety advocates appears to 
be that money spent on safety work leads to higher profitability. One may also guess that WANO’s report perhaps has 
contributed to this development. However, a company cannot survive without being profitable in the long run - but 
without a safety work (especially in this industry), no profit will be gained. Being rational could mean to communicate 
to external parties that both safety and profitability are given full attention, while some kind of golden balance between 
the two is held internally,  e.g.  as in the idea of decoupling.83 As Jackson and Carter (2002) reckons, rationality is one of 
the most important, and at the same time criticized ideas when studying organizations, yet so little explored. In the 
search for legitimacy, being rational is crucial since it is the keystone to acceptance. Most people consider themselves as 
being rational and that it is a desirable quality. Since everyone has different preferences, it might not be easy to know 
whose rationality is the most rational one. According to Jackson and Carter (2002) the most rational rationality to adopt 
is the one belonging to the most powerful authority.
 
The creation of RQH is a way of showing rationality and power of action. Since all the divisions until now have worked 
with safety issues more or less like isolated islands, it seems very rational to have someone coordinating them and make 
them strive in the same direction.  If RQH creates legitimacy,  does that make the previous way of working illegitimate? 
There is a prevailing idea in our society, that the new is better than the old, which makes change preferable to status 
quo. Some scholarly critics argue that the myth of the rapid rate of change legitimates frequent organizational changes. 
They also question whether the rate of change really is that rapid (Ohlsson and Rombach 1998). Ahrne and Papakostas 
(2002:88) uses the term inertia to describe organizations, which implies that change occurs slower than people think. 
Inertia is disliked by both conservatives and radicals (to the conservatives even a slow change is too rapid, and the 
radicals want more drastic changes).  Without necessarily being better,  the new gets more attention than the old,  which 
might make it more legitimate. Since RQH is a new function they can initially work undisturbed without pressure to 
present immediate results.  They can argue that it is so new that the effects of their work84  will not show until later 
(whenever later is). Maybe when the day called later comes, it is time to launch a new division to improve the safety 
work and at the same time create legitimacy. Røvik’s (2000) thoughts of traveling recipes could be a way to explain this 
phenomenon with basically the same product but with a new denotation (which Ringhals likes). RQH does not yet have 
an extended menu, but at the kickoff we were served a delicious antipasto shaped like HU-cards. This recipe won’t 
make the hunger disappear, but it works as an appetizer.
The fact that SKI claimed a more structured competence management can be interpreted in two different ways, in 
accordance with Røvik’s instrumental and symbolic perspectives. The instrumental perspective is derived from the 
rational-instrumental tradition with a strong belief in change. According to the instrumentalists the legitimacy of 
organizations is inevitable linked to its ability to be efficient. The symbolic perspective, on the other hand, means that 
the legitimacy of the organization depends on its capability to incorporate modern institutional ideas. The 
instrumentalist identifies a problem, and then finds a solution that fits, while the symbolist finds a recipe that generates 
legitimacy,  and implements it into the organization. So, if we apply the instrumental perspective on SKI’s requirements 
and try to see it “the way it is”: SKI wants Ringhals to structure its competence management in order to enhance the 
control over the competence. But, one could also see it in a more symbolic or semiotic way: SKI wanted Ringhals to 
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use an appropriate and legitimate recipe for competence management. That would generate legitimacy for the Swedish 
nuclear power industry, as well as for the surveillance agencies like SKI.
Disciplining
By its very nature, the nuclear power industry is characterized by “low probability-high consequence” in terms of risk. 
As we have seen, this has led to a rigorous surveillance, both for the Ringhals organization and its individuals. The 
organizational surveillance is carried out by SKI and IAEA et al. There is a broad spectrum of different kinds of 
disciplining and surveillance, but we have chosen to focus on the disciplining on the individual level. Foucault 
(2003:139-140) sees the modern disciplining as an indirect mean of power practice. The disciplining aims to school the 
employees, and in order to do so several methods are used. Foucault’s disciplining (2003:143) starts with the art of 
distribution, in which the first step is separation from the outside world.  This is easily seen at Ringhals, where we 
weren’t even allowed to get inside the gates. The new restrictions from SKI (SKIFS 2005:1) that among other things 
forbid the employees to park their cars inside the gates is another example. When you approach a nuclear power plant, 
the difference of being inside and outside becomes extremely clear, which is a part of the disciplining according to 
Foucault. To create a difference between in and out, uniformity is created through introduction to new employees. This 
is made in order to learn explicit knowledge, but also to be introduced to the culture. Or to the cult?  Senge (1990) 
writes about alignment, where the employees are schooled into a cult(ure?). After receiving isomorphic answers from 
everyone we have been speaking to, we suspect that there might be a pinch of “brainwashing” at Ringhals. Another sign 
of this is a movie on YouTube, where Vattenfall employees perform the “Vattenfall Song”85. How did they make the 
people dance like that? We can’t understand it in other terms than with the help of brainwashing (or a strong corporate 
culture if you prefer) and group pressure. A good way of marking that people belong to the same organization is to 
make them carry three colorful plastic cards (remember the HU-cards) around their necks. This might generate a pride 
of belonging to the cult(ure) and shows the outer world that you are an important member. At least,  we felt very 
important and grew two inches when were given the cards! If only they had used adequate nomenclature, the happiness 
would have been overwhelming...
The second step of the art of distribution, according to Foucault (2003:145),  is the division of space. Every individual 
has a place, and every place has an individual, and the constant knowledge of where every individual is located is an 
important issue to the disciplining. To get inside the control room you need to pass a biometric control, where your 
finger prints will be identified, which reminds you of the fact that someone knows where you are (or Big Brother is 
monitoring you). Another sign of this is that the simulator training is filmed and analyzed, and that the control room 
staff is aware of being monitored. The monitoring and measuring of everyone’s behavior and the appreciation, 
rewarding or punishment of it is an important part of disciplining according to Foucault.  Traits of these are seen in the 
Competence Analysis system, where a tremendous measuring is performed. A structuring and standardization of 
knowledge, such as Gap analysis,  could also be seen as a way of making the competence management appear more 
technical, as the engineers did according to Shenhav (1999)86. Thus, rationality, and with that legitimacy, is obtained.
Inside the control room, the operators (at least some of them) are not allowed to leave their posts, which comports with 
Foucault’s (2003:145) third step of the art of distribution: the functional locations. If there are not enough operators 
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behavioral sciences. http://pb.ams.se/Standard/SokViaYrke/VisaPlatsannonsViaYrke.aspx?ids=1326592&yo=1&yg=2414&returntourl=http%3a%2f
%2fplatsbanken.arbetsformedlingen.se%2fStandard%2fSokViaYrke%2fSokresultatViaYrke.aspx%3fq%3ds
available, the reactor must be shut down. This fact in itself has a disciplining impact on the operators, who feel obliged 
to be present and punctual.
The fourth part of the art of distribution means that everyone is interchangeable. Since the required qualifications for 
the employees are very specialized, we don’t see the disciplining here. Specialization should counteract 
interchangeability,  since it takes a long time to create a specialized employee, who then becomes unique and hard to 
replace. However the specialization might lead to a greater extent of power over the workforce, since the employees 
might become less attractive on the general labor market after a certain time period in the Ringhals organization. The 
advantage for Ringhals is enhanced control over the employees, while the employees might have more disadvantages, 
i.e. they get stuck in the system.
When writing this thesis we discussed whether control of activities, Foucault’s second part of disciplining, is relevant in 
this context, but came to the conclusion that this kind of disciplining is omnipresent in most of todays organizations. It 
is thus nothing that distinguish the nuclear power industry, whereupon we chose to exclude it.
Foucault mentions the “God sees you”-text written in black charcoal on the wall87,  but in this modern organization it’s 
more likely written in their minds - or perhaps written in invisible ink on the glass window facing the control room. 
Rather than “God sees you” it states “a reactor trip costs 4 millions SEK”. Wessblad (1998:191 ff.) writes about the 
operator who caused a reactor trip and in spite of the outspoken no-blame culture felt terribly guilty. This “invisible” 
and mental punishment is probably worse than corporal punishment.
We have also been able to watch elements of panopticism at Ringhals. Foucault (2003:196 ff.) writes about the 
panopticon as a way of surveillance, where the surveilled people are aware of being surveilled, but they never know 
exactly when the surveillance is active. In the panopticon, which is the architectural expression of panopticism, there is 
only one inspector, but in reality the number of inspectors might exceed that widely, since every colleague is a potential 
inspector. The program for knowledge transfer is also a seedbed for mutual surveillance, since the tutors and newbies 
walk side by side, supposedly watching each other. Every step should be monitored, classified and documented...
Learning
Even if people are isomorphic and disciplined they still make mistakes,  they still have a free will which in some 
situations might be problematic. According to WANO’s newsletter Inside WANO88  the human being on average 
commits six errors per hour. Since mistakes are unavoidable they have to cope with that fact and try to do the best of it. 
There are two possible strategies: to ignore mistakes or to learn from them. As we already stated in our problem 
analysis, the prerequisite for learning from a mistake is that it is known. The reporting is therefore crucial and it is 
important that people know how to report, and feels comfortable with it. This requires information on how the reporting 
should be done, but also a culture where people dare to report.
People afraid of reporting is not a new issue. So called whistle-blowers - people who alerts on disproportions in 
organizations - often experience discomfort.89  The shift supervisor Jack Godell, in the movie the China Syndrome 
(1979), who lost his life in the struggle for safety is a drastic and imaginary example. An indication of that it might be 
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87 Foucault (2003:296)
88 Inside WANO Vol 14 No 3 2006, page 8 http://www.wano.org.uk/WANO_Documents/Inside_WANO/Vol14No3/Vol14No3_en.pdf
89 http://www.fas.forskning.se/fas_templates/Page____1369.aspx retrieved 2008-05-19
worse in other industries can be found with Ödegård (1999), who compares health care with the nuclear power industry 
and the offshore industry. She concludes that the two latter has a far better safety climate than the former. The nuclear 
power and offshore industries try to fix the errors, while the health care is concerned with trying to find a scapegoat. 
Perhaps Ödegård’s results tell us more about how the health care works (or doesn’t work),  than how the nuclear power 
industry works. The lame rabbit still wins over the turtle. (Borglin, Lindell and Lindström 2008:25)90
The design of the reporting system might as well influence the reporting tendency. SKI has identified three types of 
reporting; anonymous, open and confidential.91 One could argue that it would be wise to have an anonymous reporting 
system, to maximize the reporting tendency. At Ringhals they have chosen to have an open reporting system, which in 
some cases can become anonymous i.e. if the employee chooses the paper form and leaves the name field blank.  The 
argument for the open reporting system is that it should be possible to follow up errands.  However, even if the reporting 
system would have been anonymous,  there are indicators of that people anyway would find out who did the mistake, or 
left the crucial report. This problem will always prevail in an industry where one single mistake can cost 4 MSEK92.  A 
fundamental prerequisite for a great will of reporting is the “no-blame” culture, it is crucial that the reporter is granted 
immunity and there must be neither disciplinary nor legal consequences for him/her.93 An interesting idea would be to 
flip the reasoning: Perhaps legal consequences for the person omitting reporting would be a tool to increase the number 
of reports?
Dealing with technical problems have been a speciality at Ringhals in the past,  but in fact, it is the human factor that 
commits most mistakes, and the most serious ones. TMI, Chernobyl and the Forsmark incident were all caused by the 
human factor. With a good reporting system from the Davis Besse reactor, TMI would have been prevented, and 
Ringhals had already fixed the problem with the safety system shortfall causing the Forsmark incident. Obviously there 
has been a lack of communication.  Afterwards, the incidents mentioned above have led to a certain extent of 
organizational learning in the industry and has probably prevented other major incidents and accidents.  But is it possible 
to react before an accident or incident occurs? The people at Ringhals believe it is, if near misses are dealt with at an 
early stage, and if every incident or risk observation is followed by several “Why’s?”. This can reveal more complex 
liaisons,  where one sometimes can question the entire organization’s ability to learn from experience and knowledge.94 
It all comes down to the famous balance between profitability and safety. On the message board at RQ, they have a note 
that says:
Those striving for safety shall receive a cost-effective plant. But those striving for cost-
effectiveness will encounter catastrophe.
In hindsight, you don’t have to be Einstein to agree with this statement. Mistakes tend to be expensive to repair, money 
better spent on operating experience feedback. However this is obviously not always that easy in reality. As Eriksson-
Zetterquist (2007) writes (referring to Turner and Pidgeon), some occurring threats will be discovered and prevented, 
while others are neglected. The reasons why the threats are neglected, are that they are not discovered, too heavy 
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90 As long as you have a correct reference, you are entitled to say whatever you want, right? This is something we have learned during 49 years of 
education, of which 12 years were at the university.
91 Bo Renborg, Klas Jonsson, Kristoffer Broqvist and Sven Keski-Seppälä (2006) SKI Rapport 2007:16 Hantering av händelser, nära misstag, p 23. 
Available: http://www.ski.se:80/dynamaster/file_archive/070514/84a47ac0b5305268da2cb2fe2bedd5d0/web%5f2007%2d16.pdf retrieved 
2008-05-19
92 170 000 SEK times 24 hours is approximately 4 millions.
93 Bo Renborg, Klas Jonsson, Kristoffer Broqvist and Sven Keski-Seppälä (2006) SKI Rapport 2007:16 Hantering av händelser, nära misstag, p 8. 
Available: http://www.ski.se:80/dynamaster/file_archive/070514/84a47ac0b5305268da2cb2fe2bedd5d0/web%5f2007%2d16.pdf retrieved 
2008-05-19
94 Bo Renborg, Klas Jonsson, Kristoffer Broqvist and Sven Keski-Seppälä (2006) SKI Rapport 2007:16 Hantering av händelser, nära misstag, p 34. 
Available: http://www.ski.se:80/dynamaster/file_archive/070514/84a47ac0b5305268da2cb2fe2bedd5d0/web%5f2007%2d16.pdf retrieved 
2008-05-19
workload, if the threats were discovered, they would cost too much time, money and energy to fix and most people 
consider the threat unlikely to develop into something really dangerous. Thus it is difficult to distinguish which near 
misses, risk observations and other early signs that should be taken seriously - if they are even observed.
Walking side by side, learning what to consider important to deal with, is one of the goals with the program for 
knowledge transfer. One challenge with such a “transfer” is that it is impossible (maybe not even desirable) to transfer 
knowledge in the same way as you transfer money, e-mail or electricity.  What is received is an interpretation of the sent 
package, and therefore not identical. Neither is it possible to control the individual factors that contribute to learning, 
such as motivation,  interest and learning pace. Von Krogh,  Ichijo and Nonaka (2000) stress the fact that knowledge can 
only be enabled, not managed. Knowledge enabling includes a mixture of deliberate decisions and going with the 
flow95. They suggest three actions for building a good foundation for knowledge enabling96:
1. Creating trust - breed a sense of mutual dependence,  make reliable behavior part of performance reviews and 
increase individual reliability by formulating a “map” of expectations.
2. Increasing active empathy - emphasize and invest in listening behavior for the organization’s members and 
teach them to appreciate attempts at active empathy when they experience it.
3. Fostering helping behavior - practicing pedagogical skills and intervention techniques.
Getting some extra attention and having a person to rely on are factors that we can see, in von Krogh et.  al.’s ideas as 
well as at Ringhals. It seems as the program for competence transfer is on its way towards a knowledge enabling. On 
the other hand, the knowledge transfer might be interpreted as a way of standardizing the organization. The new 
employees are in the hands of one single tutor, which might constrain the width of their learning. This can be compared 
to Kipling’s Baloo bear in the Jungle Book, who takes his tutorship with Mowgli very seriously. When Bagheera 
questions Baloo and asks how Mowgli is supposed to survive, Baloo answers: He’s with me, ain’t he? And I’ll learn him 
all I know.97
We cannot be 100 per cent certain whether Annika Bergquist has read the Jungle Book or not, but we do believe that she 
has been influenced by the good old men above (von Krogh et al.). The competence profile could be interpreted as a 
map of expectation, in accordance with the first action mentioned. By stating what competence is required (or 
desirable), it is possible for the employee to strive towards the learning needed. As we see it,  this is a way of 
competence management, which according to von Krogh et al. is impossible. Ringhals have implemented this concept 
thoroughly, and according to our respondent it seems to function quite well. It would be interesting to discuss this 
matter with von Krogh, Ichijo and Nonaka.
The surveillance might be a prerequisite as well as an obstacle to the organizational learning process. On one hand, SKI 
blamed Ringhals for being unstructured and made them launch a competence profile program, on the other hand, the 
massive bureaucracy might constrain the learning. In the same way, WANO demanded a better internal operating 
experience feedback which made Ringhals create a new division; RQH. The creation of RQH might constitute a risk 
since there is a possibility that other people and divisions of the organization relax and don't see the operating 
experience feedback as their own responsibility. They fully rely on the new division to handle these matters. A similar 
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95 Von Krogh, Ichijo and Nonaka (2000:17)
96 Von Krogh, Ichijo and Nonaka (2000:61 ff)
97 www.imdb.com/title/tt0061852/quotes retrieved 2008-05-30
reasoning can be found in Czarniawska (2007:26-27),  where Power is referred to. However, the launch of RQH is an 
important statement by Vattenfall that the safety work is taken seriously.
The practice of asking why and seeking the origins of errors on many levels is a step towards Double Loop Learning, 
since it searches deeper roots instead of just correcting the obvious (Single Loop Learning). An MTO-investigation is a 
good opening for learning, since a mistake is done and the investigators are asking “why”-questions and giving 
recommendations. Unfortunately we got the impression that the MTO-investigations seldom lead to more than a report, 
which hardly gives the opportunity to change governing variables. Argyris (1990) argues that changing governing 
variables is hard, but not impossible. When speaking to employees at Ringhals we got the picture that the nuclear power 
industry historically has been better at fixing technical problems than working with behavioral issues. Severe incidents 
(like Chernobyl and TMI) have acted as eye-opener for the industry and have improved the safety work.  Much of the 
technical correction can be characterized as Single Loop Learning,  since the questions asked are “Does this problem 
concern our reactor?” and if so, they just fix it. Human errors are by their nature more complex, which makes them 
harder to understand and adjust.
The new department, RQH, wants to change the culture at Ringhals towards a greater extent of awareness of safety in 
every operational step.  Unlike many typical leaders that speak highly about heavy organizational changes, Christer 
Axelsson surprised us by not giving the support to that kind of rhetoric.  Instead he was convinced of that to realize a 
cultural change, which imbues just about everything of the organization, the right way to go is to sneak in the changes 
so that no one notice the change until they look back and realize how much has happened. He sounded just like the 
senior manager, quoted in Kunda (1992:5): The idea is to educate people without them knowing it. Have the religion 
and not know how they ever got it! This kind of thinking has certain similarities to what Clarke (1999) calls “direct and 
indirect influence”. She conceives that the attitude and behavior of the managerial staff has a direct influence on the 
staff and its behavior. As with kids, they don’t do what you tell them to do, they do what you do. The indirect influence 
refers for instance to safety education that is arranged for the staff. But without these “telling/showing what to 
do’s” (read: managerial staff working with safety issues) the negative effects will show, according to Clarke (1999), and 
refers to when the executive group focus more on profitability than on safety for the staff.
All this thinking has made us hungry, and reminded us of the well known story of the steak. It is easy to slip into old 
habits and follow the routines without reflecting upon them. Reflection is necessary to achieve learning, which we have 
discussed. We have chosen to close our analysis with this story, as a reminder of the power of habits:
One woman would always cut off both ends of the steak and throw them away before 
placing the steak in the oven. Her husband asked her why she did this and she replied; 
“That's how you're supposed to make steak,  that's how my mother always made it”. 
Curious, her husband asked his mother-in-law, only to get the same answer from her. 
Puzzled, he asked his wife's elderly grandmother, who replied “I had to cut the ends off,  or 
else the steak would not fit in the oven”. The old ovens used to be smaller than they are 
today...
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Conclusions
So, Armageddon is here! Time to sum up...
The search for legitimacy has many faces at Ringhals. We have stated that WANO holds the discourse which gives them 
the power to hand out legitimate recipes. This recipe factory makes the nuclear power plants isomorphic, i.e. they 
become similar. Since the recipes might affect the efficacy, it is crucial to decouple the formal structures from the 
informal structures to keep a good facade. This is a survival tactic in a world where the industry is not in control over its 
own future. What they can do is adjusting to the institutional environment, which we have seen signs of. We have 
interpreted the launch of RQH in terms of legitimacy searching. The phenomenon in itself is not new, but giving it a 
new costume brings attention to the safety issues and might speed up the change process, which always is slow due to 
inertia.
We believe that Ringhals is largely affected by disciplining in terms of Foucault. This has been an exciting journey, and 
seen in hindsight we are not that sad anymore over the fact that we weren’t entrusted to enter the gates.  We have found 
fractions of strong corporate culture, separation from the outside world, division of space, functional locations and 
interchangeability.  We have also compared Ringhals with Foucault’s panopticon and concluded that the disciplining 
probably makes the employees isomorphic and tractable.
Ringhals has a thorough learning toolbox. As a new employee you are incorporated through a twelve-step program, and 
in some cases you get your own tutor. A competence analysis is done regularly and if you are a control room operator 
you will receive simulator training. The operating experience feedback imbues the entire organization. We have 
considered high reporting frequency as a prerequisite for learning, which turned our interest to factors contributing to 
reporting. Such factors are a good and easy accessible reporting system, adequate information to the employees and the 
absence of a scapegoat culture. SKI has concluded that legal consequences for the reporting employee would decrease 
their reporting. We think that legal consequences for the non-reporting employee might increase the reporting tendency. 
Besides the reporting, we believe that their practice to ask “Why” is a good way of learning from experiences.
Self-criticism
In this thesis we have heavily relied on two visits at Ringhals power plant. With the limited empirics in mind, our 
conclusions may seem far-fetched and drastic. Our motto has been that even if our conclusions are not revolutionary, we 
still wanted to serve an entertaining text. If you have managed to read this far, and have yawned less than twenty times, 
that’s the best grade we can get.
The fact that our respondents were chosen for us might have contributed to the uniform answers, but also created a 
desire inside of us to see through the facade.  We don’t believe that we got the full picture,  but at least we have tried to 
keep a critical approach. We could have interviewed a greater number of people, but considering the uniform answers, 
we’re not sure that it would have given a broader perspective. We don’t think that people would have revealed any 
serious disproportions, even if there were any.  With these prerequisites we still think that we have been able to produce 
a relevant analysis.
The social scientist is a part of the world he or she studies. We have used much electricity during the work on this 
thesis. How is it then possible for us to be objective?
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INES The International Nuclear Event Scale
MTO Man Technology Organization
PJB Pre Job Briefing, a meeting held before starting a new project
R1 Reactor 1 at Ringhals
R2 Reactor 2 at Ringhals
R3 Reactor 3 at Ringhals
R4 Reactor 4 at Ringhals
RIO Riskobservation, Risk Observation
RO Rapportervärd Omständighet, Reportable Event
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SKI Statens kärnkraftinspektion, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate
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STF Säkerhetstekniska föreskrifter, Safety Technical Prescriptions. A document derived from the SAR
TMI Three Mile Island. The name of the nuclear power plant outside Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, that had a reactor 
 meltdown in March 1979.
WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators
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